Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison by Weiss, Friedl & Steiner, Silke
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 30, Issue 5 2006 Article 8
Transparency as an Element of Good
Governance in the Practice of the EU and the
WTO: Overview and Comparison
Friedl Weiss∗ Silke Steiner†
∗
†
Copyright c©2006 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Transparency as an Element of Good
Governance in the Practice of the EU and the
WTO: Overview and Comparison
Friedl Weiss and Silke Steiner
Abstract
This article seeks to provide a comparative overview of relevant practice of the European
Union (”EU”) and the World Trade Organization (”WTO”) with regard to the interpretation and
use made of “good governance,” and in particular with regard to ”transparency,” one of its core
component elements.
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of the last few years, numerous attempts have
been made to solve the problem of an emerging transnational
legal order that still significantly lacks both democratic legiti-
macy and transparency. To that end, a number of theoretical
concepts and models have been developed, aimed at guarantee-
ing a more legitimate exercise of international authority.'
The evocative concept of "good governance," though a rela-
tively young one, has recently emerged as a key concept in dis-
course about governance. Various intergovernmental institu-
tions have formulated similar definitions of good governance,
yet have attributed to them different meanings and functions
and use them for different purposes. This article seeks to pro-
vide a comparative overview of relevant practice of the European
Union ("EU") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO") with
regard to the interpretation and use made of "good govern-
ance," and in particular with regard to "transparency," one of its
core component elements.
Before examining such practice, however, it should be recal-
led that, while both the EU and the WTO have made considera-
ble strides toward enhancing transparency in their respective
spheres of governance, they have done so from different vantage
points and perspectives, due to their fundamentally different sta-
* Professor at the Department of European, International and Comparative Law,
University of Vienna.
** Assistant at the Department of European, International and Comparative Law,
University of Vienna.
1. Examples are globalism (the idea of a global democracy and/or a global state),
networkism (the designation of coordinating governmental or private networks), or so-
cial constitutionalism (the identification of separate global societal spheres). For more
details see Rainer Nickel, Participatoiy Transnational Governance, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL, REGULATION 157, 163-175 (Christian
Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
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tus and legal characteristics as intergovernmental organizations.
Suffice it to recall that the EC, unlike the "intergovernmental"
WTO, is a uniquely supranational organization. Its constitutive
legal order has been developed and refined by two of its institu-
tions of central importance, the European Commission and the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). The former has been the
Community's acknowledged "engine of integration policy."2
The latter is a court of law enjoying a monopoly on dispute set-
tlement,3 which has been credited with the establishment of the
fundamental doctrines of the supremacy and direct effect of
Community law.4
By contrast, global integration of trade policies through the
legal framework of the "Member-driven" WTO, a less homogene-
ous organization of 150 Members, is not supported by organs
comparable to those in the EC. Its executive head, the Director-
General, may not even construct a negotiating agenda for the
Members under his own authority,5 and the Appellate Body
("AB") is not, as yet, an independent court of law.6
Thus, it is not surprising that the WTO has not been very
active in adopting measures aiming at the implementation of the
concept of good governance, whereas its twin concept of sustain-
able development is explicitly referred to as an objective in the
preamble to the WTO Agreement and has, as such, been in-
voked by the AB.7
2. John W. Cioffi, The Collapse of the European Union Directive on Corporate Takeovers:
The EU, National Politics, and the Limits of Integration, (Berkeley Roundtable on the Inter-
national Economy, Research Paper, 2001), http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/
John%20Cioffi's%20paper.pdf.
3. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
292, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), [hereinafter EC Treaty] (stating "rm]ember
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.")
4. See Peter Holmes, The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, 13 (Uni-
versity of Sussex at Brighton, Discussion Paper 78, 2001), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
Units/economics/dp/holmes78.pdf.
5. EC Treaty, supra note 3, OJ. C 325/33 (2002).
6. See Holmes, supra note 4, at 8, 11.
7. See Surya P. Subedi, Managing the "Second Agricultural Revolution" Through Interna-
tional Law: Liberalisation of Trade in Agriculture and Sustainable Development, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 161 (Nico
Schrijver & Friedl Weiss eds., 2004). See also Appellate Body Report, United States -
Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 12, 67, 129-130, T/DS58/
AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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1. THE CONCEPTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
TRANSPARENCY: ORIGIN, CONTENT AD DEFINITIONS
1.1 Origins of "Good Governance"
Although the idea, concept and objective of good govern-
ance have regularly been used for a good number of years, its
content and contours remain uncertain. Indeed, a multitude of
definitions of differing scope and content have given rise to an
"increasing confusion regarding the boundaries of the con-
cept."'
Yet, conceivably, some kind of "common understanding," at
least with respect to the core elements of good governance, may
already be discerned in the practice of certain international or-
ganizations.
The notion of good governance itself originated in the prac-
tice of international donor agencies, particularly of the World
Bank, not in any academic discourse or context. It was used for
the first time in the 1989 World Bank Report on Sub-Saharan
Africa, which characterized the crisis in the region as a "crisis of
governance," including rampant corruption and resistance to re-
forms by recipient governments, rendering the provision of aid
ineffective. 9 In the late eighties, especially after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the concept of good governance gained currency. A
new approach was initiated according to which regimes of dubi-
ous legitimacy and governmental practice will not be supported,
while eligibility for support is conditional upon institutional re-
forms by potential client/recipient states as well as upon the
manner in which they conduct their governmental affairs. °
During the 1990s," good governance has, in this way,
8. Carlos Santiso, Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Condi-
tionality, 7 GEO. PUB. POL'V REV. 1, 3 (2001).
9. See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
80, (Nov. 1989) (identifying lack of good governance as underlying cause of economic
problems in Sub-Saharan Africa); see also Thandika Mkandawire, Director, United Na-
tions Research Institute for Social Development, The Itinerary of an Idea, VIEWPOINr, Oct.
1, 2004, http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/newsview.nsf/ (httpNews)/2C5859
E012A29D06C12570220036B48A?OpenDocument (claiming African origin of concept
and decrying current divergence of term from original concept).
10. See Santiso, supra note 8, at 5; Martin Doornbos, 'Good governance: The rise and
decline of a policy metaphor?, 37J. DEv. STUDIES 93, 96-97 (2001).
11. For further details, see generally Carlos Santiso, International Cooperation for
Good Governance and Democracy: Moving Toward a Second Generation?, 13 EUR. J. DEV. RE-
SEARCH 154 (2001).
20071 1547
1548 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1545
emerged as an integral part of the wider process of democratiza-
tion, arguably reflecting a general trend of "democratization of
international law,"'" at least of a general underpinning by inter-
national law of the widening process of democratization. 3
1.2 Content of Good Governance
The shift that has occurred from the notion of governance
to that of good governance implies an additional normative di-
mension pertaining to the quality of governance. A system of
good governance, consequently, stems from the fulfillment of
particular process requirements, both with respect to decision-
making and to the formulation of public policy. For instance,
researchers at the World Bank Institute have distinguished six
main dimensions of good governance:
* Voice and accountability, which includes civil liberties
and political stability;
* Government effectiveness, including the quality of pol-
icy-making and public service delivery;
" Lack of regulatory burden;
* Rule of law, including the protection of property rights;
* Independence of the judiciary;
* Control of corruption.' 4
1.3 International Organizations: Definitions and Practice
1.3.1 Definitions
As mentioned above, there is no generally accepted defini-
tion of good governance. On the other hand, however, defini-
tions developed in international organizations only slightly differ
from one another.
12. See Roda Mushkat, The Principle of Public Participation: An Asia-Pacific Perspective,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE, 607,
608 (Nico Schrijver and Friedl Weiss, eds., 2004) (citing Philippe Sands, Turtles and
Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 527, 537-
543 (2001)).
13. Examples for a great deal of development of democracy-promotion through
international law are election-monitoring by international organizations and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, the institutionalization of these functions, for instance
through the OSCE Office of Fair Elections, and the jurisprudence of international
courts and commissions in this field. SeeJames Crawford, Democracy in International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 39 (James Crawford, ed., 2002).
14. Santiso, supra note 11, at 5.
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The most recent definition by the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ("ES-
CAP") differs only slightly from earlier definitions by the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").
One additional component states that good governance "is also
responsive to the present and future needs of society. ' 15 The
eight key components of good governance are:' 6
(1.) Accountable
(2.) Transparent
(3.) Responsive
(4.) Equitable and inclusive
(5.) Effective and efficient
(6.) Follows the rule of law
(7.) Participatory
(8.) Consensus oriented
In its policy paper, Governance for Sustainable Human Development,
the United Nations Development Program ("UNDP") defines
good governance as, among other things, participatory, transpar-
ent, and accountable as well as effective, equitable, and as pro-
moting the rule of law.' 7 Good governance, accordingly, seeks
to ensure that political, social and economic priorities are based
on a broad consensus in society and that the voices of the
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making
on the allocation of development resources.'
UNDP's definition is clearly very similar to those of the
OECD and ESCAP, as it also includes the elements of participa-
tion, accountability, effectiveness, equity, consensus orientation,
and the promotion of the rule of law. It does not, however, en-
compass the elements of inclusiveness and transparency, unlike
the foregoing definitions.
In the absence of a generally accepted definition of good
governance, the eight essential aspects of good governance iden-
tified in the OECD and ESCAP definitions might be considered
15. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
What is Good Governance (2007), http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/
Ongoing/gg/governance.pdf [hereinafter ESCAP].
16. Id. at 3.
17. United Nations Development Program, Governance for Sustainable Human
Development (1997), http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/
undppolicydoc97-e.pdf.
18. Id.
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as core elements of good governance. Transparency, though
missing in UNDP's definition, is likewise widely accepted as an
essential component of good governance. It also features in the
OECD's anti-corruption instruments. Moreover, transparency,
even if not always mentioned explicitly, may be considered im-
plied by nearly all definitions. It is also noteworthy that all defi-
nitions of good governance considered above are aimed at
(good) governance by national governments. When, in July
1997, the UNDP convened the International Conference on
Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity, its first global
conference on governance at the United Nations Headquarters,
it did not extend its definition of (good) governance to interna-
tional organizations, despite the participation of representatives
of UN Specialized Agencies, nor was there any discussion of the
international dimension of national good governance. 9
1.3.2 Practice
Is there as yet any discernible practice in international orga-
nizations based on "good governance," or at least habitual refer-
ence to the term "good governance"? And if so, does such refer-
ence only concern the "external dimension" of good governance
as it were, i.e., the promotion of good governance in third coun-
tries, or is the concept also relied upon in relation to internal
(administrative) proceedings? The OECD has published numer-
ous studies analyzing what amounts to good public as well as cor-
porate governance. 21 It has also adopted several legal instru-
ments against corruption, thereby fostering good governance. 2'
19. Friedl Weiss & Paul de Waart, International Economic Law with a Human Face: An
Introductoy View, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 1, 9 (Friedl
Weiss, Paul de Waart, & Eric Denters eds., 1998).
20. See e.g., OECD, MODERNISING GOVERNMENT: THE WAY FORWARD (2005); OECD,
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION OF POLICY AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION PRACTICE, (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/50/36502447.pdf; OECD,
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004).
21. See e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1992, 337 I.L.M. 8; see also, Revised Recommen-
dation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
May 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1016; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax
Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, C(96)27/FINAL (Apr. 11, 1996), 35
l.L.M. 1311; OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; Working Party on Export Credits
and Credit Guarantees, Action Statement on Bribery and Officially Supported Export
Credits, Feb. 20, 2003, TD/ECG(2000)15.
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Other OECD documents also explicitly refer to the term
"good governance." Thus, in 1993, its Development Assistance
Committee ("DAC") adopted orientations on participatory de-
velopment and good governance and established an ad hoc
Working Party on Participatory Development and Good Govern-
ance ("PDGG") with the mandate to help bring PDGG into the
mainstream of development co-operation by means of a three-
year program of activities.22
One noteworthy aspect, however, is that the definition and
practice of good governance mentioned above refer to the "ex-
ternal dimension" of governance, namely good governance in
third world or developing countries.
1.4 The "European Understanding" of Good Governance
In the European context, the idea of good administration as
an element of good governance existed long before the concept
of good governance gained currency. As early as 1977, the
Council of Europe focused on good administrative behavior as
an aspect of good governance, arguing that since the develop-
ment of the modern state had resulted in an increasing impor-
tance of public administrative activities, individuals were more
frequently affected by administrative procedures.23 In view of
the principal task of the Council of Europe, the protection of
individual fundamental rights and freedoms, it intended to un-
dertake efforts "to improve the individual's procedural position
vis-d-vis the administration with a view to adopting rules which
would ensure fairness in the relations between the citizen and
the administrative authorities."24 Accordingly, good administra-
tive behavior is characterized by several principles, namely, a
right to be heard, access to information, assistance, and repre-
sentation, statement of reasons, and an indication of remedies.
In its White Paper on European Governance of 2001, the
European Commission established its own concept of "European
22. See OECD Development Assistance Committee, Final Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance Parts I and 2,
24/6/1997; Development Assistance Committee, Evaluation of Programmes Promoting
Participatory Development and Good Governance (1997), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/31/13/2755291 .pdf.
23. Council of Europe Resolution on the Protection of the Individual in Relation
to the Acts of Administrative Authorities, Res. 77(31) (Sept. 28, 1977).
24. Id.
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governance," defined as rules, processes, and behavior that af-
fect the way in which powers are exercised at European level,
particularly as regards openness, 25 participation, accountabil-
ity,26 effectiveness, and coherence. 27 These five "principles of
good governance" reinforce those of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality.28
In the view of one author, interestingly, the concept of good
governance is one of the four "minor core norms" comprised
within the acquis communautaire, the only one that has not yet
found any formal expression in the treaties.29 However, good
governance may well be seen as implicit in the Copenhagen cri-
teria for democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe as
well as in the emphasis on the role of governance in the EU's aid
programs.3
0
1.5 Transparency as a Particular Element of Good Governance
As has been shown above, transparency, whether explicitly
mentioned or derived from the context, is an integral part of
nearly all definitions of good governance and is regularly used in
practice. Nonetheless, its meaning, content, scope, and con-
tours are not entirely clear.
Transparency in ESCAP's definition means that,
decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner
that follows rules and regulations. It also means that informa-
25. Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: White Pa-
per from the Commission to the European Council, COM (2001) 428 Final, at 10 (July
2001) (stating "The Institutions should work in a more open manner. Together with
the Member States, they should actively communicate about what the EU does and the
decisions it takes. They should use language that is accessible and understandable for
the general public. This is of particular importance in order to improve the confidence
in complex institutions") [hereinafter European Governance White Paper].
26. Id. (stating "[rioles in the legislative and executive processes need to be
clearer").
27. Id. (stating "[p]olicies and action must be coherent and easily understood").
28. Id.; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
29. lan Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J. COMMON
MARKET STUD., 235, 242-243(2002). For background on the acquis communautaire, see
P.J.G. Kapteyn & P.VerLoren van Themaat, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIEs 45-68, (1998).
30. See Manners, supra note 29, at 241. To Manners, the "core norms" are peace,
liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human tights and fundamental
freedoms. The other three terms identified as "minor core norms" (besides good gov-
ernance) are social solidarity, anti-discrimination and sustainable development. Id. at
242-43.
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tion is freely available and directly accessible to those who will
be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also
means that enough information is provided and that it is pro-
vided in easily understandable forms and media.3
This definition includes openness of the decision-making and
enforcement processes as well as access to and distribution of
information. It will be interesting to examine how the EU and
the WTO define and understand "transparency" and which mea-
sures they have taken to implement its prescriptions.
2. TRANSPARENCY AS AN ELEMENT OF GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
2.1 The Internal Dimension of Transparency and Good Governance
in the Legal Framework of the EU
In March 2000, one year before the publication of its
White Paper on European Governance, the European Commission
adopted a White Paper on Administrative Reform, which stressed
that European public administration should focus on the key
principles of service, independence, responsibility, accountabil-
ity, efficiency and transparency.3 2 The Commission also took an
important practical step towards implementing those principles
by adopting a code of good administrative behavior. 33 Accord-
ingly, relations between the Commission and the public should
be based on the principles of legality, non-discrimination, pro-
portionality of measures to the aim pursued, and consistency in
administrative behavior.34
The above-mentioned White Paper on European Governance,
though occasioned by and drafted against the backdrop of the
EU enlargement process, provides, nonetheless, a useful contri-
bution to the discourse on global governance. The EU evidently
distinguishes between an internal and an external dimension of
good governance, as the White Paper attempts to correlate both
dimensions. In view of the Commission, therefore, it is incum-
bent upon the EU, as a first step, to strive for successful reform
31. ESCAP, supra note 15, at 2.
32. See European Governance White Paper, supra note 25, at 26.
33. European Commission, Code of Good Administrative Behaviour - Relations
with the Public, adopted on 13 September 2000, published in the Annex to the Com-
mission Decision of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules of Procedure, see (2000/633/
EC, ECSC, Euratom), 2000 O.J. L 267/63.
34. See id. at 3.
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of governance "at home" so as to strengthen the case for change
at an international level.35
Like the Council of Europe, the EU too places particular
emphasis on good administrative behavior as a crucial element
of good "European" governance. This focus is particularly re-
flected in the "European Code of Good Administrative Behav-
ior," a document drafted by the European Ombudsman that ex-
plains, in a detailed manner, the meaning of a "right to good
administration" that is embodied in Article 41 of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights.
36
The Code was aimed at EU institutions and bodies, in the
expectation that in their relations with the public they would ei-
ther adopt their own codes or respect the Ombudsman's Code.
As a result, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on
the European Ombudsman's Code of Good Administrative Be-
havior,3 7 as did the Secretary-General of the Council/High Rep-
resentative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.3
Since then, debates have intensified on the need to increase
transparency in an enlarged Union of twenty-seven Member
States, and the European Council included transparency under
the headline "more democracy, transparency and efficiency in
the European Union" in its 2001 Laeken Declaration on the Fu-
ture of the European Union.39
35. European Governance White Paper, supra note 25, at 26.
36. THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, THE CODE OF GOOD ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR,
at 7, available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/code/pdf/en/code2005-en.pdf.
Substantial requirements for establishing a good administration enumerated by the
code are: lawfulness (art.4), non-discrimination (art.5), proportionality (art.6), non-
abuse of power (art.7), impartiality and independence (art.8), objectivity (art.9), legiti-
mate expectations, consistency and advice (art.10), etc.
37. European Parliament Resolution on the European Ombudsman's Special Re-
port to the European Parliament following the own-initiative inquiry into the existence
and the public accessibility, in the different Community institutions and bodies, of a
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, O.J. C 72E/331 (2002). In its resolution, the
EP adopted the text of the Ombudsman's draft with some modifications. Transparency
is not mentioned in the code adopted by the European Parliament.
38. Secretary-General of the Council, Decision No. 2001/C 189/01, O.J. C 189, at
1-4 (2001). This modified version (shorter than the Code drafted by the European
Ombudsman and adopted by the EP) refers to transparency in its preamble: "The provi-
sions of Community law on openness and transparency should be fully respected in the
daily practice of the General Secretariat of the Council..."
39. Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, (Dec. 14-15,
2001), SN 300/1/01 REV 1, Annex 1: Laeken Declaration on the Future of the Euro-
pean Union, at 19.
TRANSPARENCY AS AN ELEMENT
Although transparency has evidently come to be seen as an
important element of good "European" governance, the term
"transparency," surprisingly, is only mentioned twice in the White
Paper on European Governance, under the title "confidence in ex-
pert advice,"4 ° in the chapter on "better policies, regulation and
delivery," and in the context of "the EU's contribution to global
governance."4 Similarly, the Code of Good Administrative Be-
havior does not explicitly refer to good governance but merely
identifies some requirements of good administration which are
related to transparency, such as that of requests for information
(Article 22), public access to documents (Article 23) or that of
the keeping of adequate records (Article 24).42
Nevertheless, since 2006 transparency has been treated as a
particularly important issue, both by the Council of Ministers
and by the Commission. At first the European Council outlined
its overall policy on transparency when it agreed that all deliber-
ations of the Council of Ministers on legislative acts subject to
the co-decision procedure4" "shall be open to the public as shall
the votes and the explanation of votes by the Council members"
subject only to the possibility for the Council or Coreper to ex-
clude such public access in individual cases.4 4 By adapting its
Rules of Procedure the Council of Ministers confirmed the deci-
40. See European Governance White Paper, supra note 25, at 19.
[T]he Union is required to apply the precautionary principle and play its role
in risk assessment and risk management. The Commission over a number of
years has been responding to these challenges, for example, through the re-
vamping of its system of scientific committees in 1997 and ensuring that scien-
tific advice from those committees is publicly available. The current proposal
for a European Food Authority will enhance the Union's scientific capability,
transparency and networking in the area of food safety.
41. See id at 26.
By acknowledging the global dimension more strongly, the Union will
strengthen its voice in multilateral negotiations. It should aim to improve the
effectiveness and legitimacy of global rule making, working to modernise and
reform international and multi-lateral institutions in the medium to long
term. The goal should be to boost the effectiveness and enforcement powers
of multi-lateral institutions. In the short term, the Union should build partner-
ships with other countries in order to promote greater co-operation and co-
herence between the activities of existing international organisations and in-
crease their transparency.
42. THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, THE CODE OF GooD ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR,
supra note 38, at 18.
43. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.251, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
44. See European Council Meeting in Brussels, 15/16 June 2006, Presidency Con-
clusions, 10633/1/06 REV 1, Annex 1: An Overall Policy on Transparency, at 23.
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sions taken by the European Council. 45 Furthermore, initial de-
liberations on other legislative acts, presented orally by the Com-
mission in a Council session, were also opened to the public.
Unless otherwise decided by a qualified majority decision by the
Council or Coreper, the Presidency may extend that regime on a
case-by-case basis to subsequent deliberations concerning a par-
ticular item. 46  Practical implementing measures, such as In-
ternet video-streaming and online access to webcast public delib-
erations, were also agreed upon to enable citizens to fully benefit
from increased transparency. 4
7
In 2006, the European Commission also launched the "Eu-
ropean Transparency Initiative," aimed at strengthening the
45. Council Decision adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure 2006/683, 15
September 2006, 2006 O.J. L 285 47 (Euratom).
46. Id. at art. 8 (providing that Council deliberations be open to the public and
public debates:
1. Council deliberations on legislative acts to be adopted in accordance with
the codecision procedure under Art. 251 of the EC Treaty shall be open to the
public as follows:
(a) the presentation, if any, by the Commission of its legislative proposals and
the ensuing deliberation in the Council shall be open to the public;
(b) the vote on such legislative acts shall be open to the public, as well as the
final Council deliberations leading to that vote and the explanations of voting
accompanying it;
(c) all other Council deliberations on such legislative acts shall be open to the
public, unless, on a case by case basis, the Council or Coreper decides other-
wise with regard to a given deliberation.
2. The Council's first deliberation on important new legislative proposals
other than those to be adopted in accordance with the codecision procedure
shall be open to the public. The Presidency shall identify which new legislative
proposals are important and the Council or Coreper may decide otherwise,
whenever appropriate. The Presidency may decide, on a case by case basis,
that the subsequent Council deliberations on a particular legislative act shall
be open to the public, unless the Council or Coreper decides otherwise.
3. On a decision taken by the Council or by Coreper, acting by a qualified
majority, the Council shall hold public debates on important issues affecting
the interests of the European Union and its citizens.
It shall be for the Presidency, any member of the Council, or the Commission
to propose issues or specific subjects for such debates, taking into account the
importance of the matter and its interest to citizens.)
47. Art. 5(2) of Council Decision 2006/683:
The opening to the public of Council deliberations and public debates in ac-
cordance with this Article shall be made through public transmission by audio-
visual means, notably in an overflow room and through broadcasting in all
official languages of the institutions of the European Union using video-
streaming. A recorded version shall remain available for at least one month
on the Council's Internet site. The outcome of voting shall be indicated by
visual means.
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rules of ethics for conduct by EU policy-makers and for "civil
society" pressure groups, such as lobbyists, NGOs, etc., who seek
to influence them.48 On May 3, 2006, as part of that initiative, it
published a Green Paper on European Transparency,49 which ex-
plains the objective of the Transparency Initiative as consisting
of the adoption of a series of transparency-related measures that
have already been put in place by the Commission, in particular
those taken as part of the overall reforms outlined in the White
Paper on European Governance.5" It should also be noted that a
review has been launched in the framework of the European
Transparency Initiative, of the Commission's overall approach to
transparency. 5'
2.2 The External Dimension of Transparency in the Good
Governance Framework of the EU
Although "internal" good governance is mainly based upon
good administrative behavior and transparency, 52 the term
"good governance" is hardly ever used in EU practice in connec-
tion with the internal dimension of governance.53 Instead, it is
frequently used in reference to the promotion of European val-
ues as part of the EU's foreign policy.
54
A typical means of achieving or promoting good govern-
ance is the concept of political conditionality. Conditionality,
which was first introduced by the Lome III Convention, signifi-
48. Commission of the European Communities, European Transparency Initiative:
Green Paper, COM(2006) 194 Final, (March 3, 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Green
Paper].
49. Id.
50. The Commission lists "access to documents"-legislation, the launch of
databases providing information about consultative bodies and expert advisory groups,
and the in-depth impact assessments prior to legislative proposals as essential contribu-
tions towards implementing the Commission's "better lawmaking" policy and the Com-
mission's "Code of Good Administrative Behavior."
51. Transparency Green Paper, supra note 48, COM(2006) 194 final, at 2f.
52. For more details on transparency in the EU, see below.
53. However, in the White Paper on European Governance, the principles of good
governance also refer to the internal dimension of good governance. "They underpin
democracy and the rule of law in the Member States, but they apply to all levels of
government - global, European, national, regional and local." See European Govern-
ance White Paper, 10 COM(2001) 428 Final.
54. See, e.g., Parliament Resolution on the Commission Communication entitled
"Democratisation, The Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance:
The Challenges of the Partnership Between the European Union and the ACP States,"
O.J. C 104/177 (1999).
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cantly changed the EC-ACP association process and is now firmly
established in the Cotonou Agreement,55 which also recognizes
good governance as a general underpinning 56 and stipulates "re-
spect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of
law" defined as "an essential element" of the Agreement. 57
Three elements of the Agreement's political dimension are
deemed vital for the partnership and for sustainable develop-
ment: respect for human rights, democratic principles based on
the rule of law, and transparent and accountable governance. 8
Violation of these elements is subject to a new procedure
stressing the responsibility of the country in question.59
As a key concept, good governance is already referred to in
the preamble, with signatories "acknowledging that a political
environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and
good governance is part and parcel of long term development."
In a similar vein, the political dialogue (Article 8) encompasses
"a regular assessment of the developments concerning the re-
spect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law
and good governance."60 Overall, the approach of the agree-
ment consists of "strengthening the institutions necessary for the
consolidation of democracy, good governance and for efficient
and competitive market economies."61
Article 96 sets out the possible legal consequences of a viola-
tion of an "essential element, '"62 a reference to Article 9 (2)
55. 2000/483/EC: Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community
and Its Member States, on the Other Part, June 23, 2000, O.J. L 317 (2000), at 3-353,
signed in Cotonou [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement].
56. Cf. id. art.9(3): "Good governance, which underpins the ACP-EU Partnership,
shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute a
fundamental element of this Agreement."
57. MARTIN HOLLAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD 42,50 (2002).
58. See Cotonou Agreement, supra note 55, at 2, ("Summary: Pillar I").
59. See Summary of Cotonou Agreement, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/
lvb/rl2101.htm; see also Cotonou Agreement, art. 9.
60. Cotonou Agreement art. 8.
61. Id. art. 20.
62. Id. art. 96 (listing as essential elements: consultation procedure and appropri-
ate measures as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law:
2. (a) If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Par-
ties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation
stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule
of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Art. 9, it shall, except in cases of special
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which defines and sanctions them. Both good governance and
transparency play an important role and are mentioned in Arti-
cle 9, but not in its paragraph 2, as "essential elements." How-
ever, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the
rule of law can be seen as elements of the "umbrella term" good
governance, which-according to Article 9(3)-underpins the
Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP")-EU Partnership.
Transparency also plays an important role as regards the ex-
ternal dimension of good governance and is mentioned in sev-
eral contexts in the Cotonou Agreement, especially in connec-
tion with competition policy (Article 45),64 macroeconomic and
structural reforms and policies (Article 22), 6 and the need to
increase market transparency through a better operation of in-
ternational commodity markets (Article 40).66 Furthermore, the
parties' commitment to transparency under the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"),67 as well as
urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers with the relevant
information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view
to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties...
... If the consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if
consultation is refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures
may be taken. These measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for
taking them have disappeared.
* . . (c) The "appropriate measures" referred to in this Article are measures
taken in accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation.
In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least
disrupt the application of this agreement. It is understood that suspension
would be a measure of last resort.
63. Id. art. 9(3) (stating:
In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is
the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic
and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable develop-
ment. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public author-
ities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the man-
agement and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating
and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating
corruption.
Good governance, which underpins the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin
the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute a funda-
mental element of this Agreement.)
64. Id. art. 45.
65. Id. art. 22.
66. Id. art. 40.
67. Id. art. 47 ("they [the parties] reaffirm their commitment under the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade, annexed to the WTO Agreement (TBT Agree-
ment)").
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under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"),6  is emphasized.
Lastly, one might mention several general references to the
parties' commitments under the WTO Agreements that show
the importance the EC is attributing to the WTO in its relations
with the ACP-countries. "Full conformity" with the provisions of
the WTO is mentioned as one of the "objectives and principles"
of the Cotonou Agreement.69 The parties also stress the impor-
tance they attach to their active participation in the WTO.70
2.3 Transparency and Good Governance as Bases for
Claims of Individuals
2.3.1 Transparency as a Basis of Individual Rights of
Access to Documents
An important aspect of transparency that is of particular im-
portance to individual citizens is the right of access to docu-
ments of the institutions. Adumbrated as a principle by Declara-
tion 17 on the right of access to information annexed to the Fi-
nal Act of the Treaty of Maastricht, 7t it was subsequently inserted
into the EC-Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam. In December
1999, the Council and the Commission approved a Code of Con-
duct concerning public access to Council and Commission docu-
ments, 7' establishing principles to govern access to documents
held by these institutions. To implement that undertaking, the
Council and the Commission adopted Decisions 93/731/EC
68. Id. art. 48 (stating "they [the parties] reaffirm their commitments under the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, annexed to the
I rTO Agreement (SPS Agreement), taking account of their respective level of develop-
ment").
69. Id. art. 34(4) (stating "[e]conomic and trade cooperation shall be imple-
mented in full conformity with the provisions of the rrO, including special and differ-
ential treatment, taking account of the Parties' mutual interests and their respective
levels of development").
70. Id. art. 39(1,2) (stating "[t]hey agree to cooperate closely in identifying and
furthering their common interests in international economic and trade cooperation in
particular in the INTO, including participation in setting and conducting the agenda in
future multilateral trade negotiations").
71. EC Treaty, supra note 3, declaration 17, O.J. C. 325/5 (2002), stating "[t]he
Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the
democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administra-
tion."
72. See Code of Conduct No. 93/730/EC, O.J. L 340/41, at 41 (1993).
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(Council) 7:' and 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom (Commission)74 on
public access to their documents. The Treaty of Amsterdam in-
corporated Article 255 EC into the EC Treaty. This provision
explicitly guarantees a right of access to documents to natural or
legal persons residing or having a registered office in a Member
State.7 5
Article 255 also provides the legal basis for Regulation (EC)
No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of May 30, 2001, regarding public access to European Parlia-
ment, Council and Commission documents ("Transparency Reg-
ulation") .76 The Transparency Regulation provides the frame-
work, general principles, scope, and limits for access to the un-
published documents of the EU institutions and bodies, through
registers of documents or upon individual application. It applies
to documents held, i.e. adopted and received by the European
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, including sensi-
tive documents, thereby significantly expanding the rules on
public access to documents. It has rightly been referred to as a
"milestone in the European institutions' policy on openness. ' 77
Access can only be refused if the disclosure of a document could
undermine the protection of a specified public 7 or private inter-
est, especially the privacy and integrity of the individual, particu-
larly taking into consideration the protection of personal data in
accordance with Community legislation.7 9 In such instances, a
weighing of interests is required. 0
73. See generally Council Decision No. 93/731/EC, O.J. L 340/43 43 (1993) (stating
the decision on public access to Council documents).
74. Commission Decision No. 94/90/ECSC, O.J. L. 046/58, at 58, art. 1 (1994).
75. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C.
340/1, art. 255 (1997) (stating "Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to the
principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3").
76. See generally Commission Regulation No. 1049/2001, OJ. L 145/43 (2001).
77. Marc Maes, The "New" Regulation on Access to Documents, in INCREASING TRANS-
PARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 199-
207 (Veerle Deckmyn ed., 2002).
78. Commission Regulation No. 1049/2001, art. 4(a) O.J. L 145/43, at 43-48
(2001) (listing the following reasons for a refusal of disclosure on the grounds of public
interest: public security, defense and military matters, international relations, and the
financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State.)
79. Id., art. 4, at 45.
80. Id. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
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Applications for access to documents have to be made in
writing, including electronic means.8 ' Reasons are not required,
but applications must be sufficiently precise to enable the institu-
tion to identify the requested document.8 2
Applications for access are to be handled "promptly," i.e.,
granted or refused within a period of 15 working days.83 Written
reasons must be provided for refusals, whether partial or total.
8 4
The applicant may, however, make a confirmatory application,
asking the institution concerned to reconsider its position. 5 In
the event of a partially or totally negative decision on the confir-
matory application, the applicant has the right to initiate an an-
nulment procedure according to Article 230 EC as well as to
lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman. 6 Failure to reply
within 15 days is deemed to constitute a negative reply, trigger-
ing an applicant's right to institute court proceedings 7 and/or
to make a complaint to the Ombudsman. 8
2.3.2 Individual Rights Guaranteed by the Fundamental Rights
Charter and the Draft Constitutional Treaty
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which was
later incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly pro-
vides for both a right to good administration (Article 41)89 and
of access to documents (Article 42)9" as fundamental rights of
citizens of the EU.
The right to good administration was incorporated in Arti-
cle 11-101 of the Constitution for Europe,9 based on the exis-
undermine the protection of: commercial interests of a natural or legal person, includ-
ing intellectual property, court proceedings and legal advice, the purpose of inspec-
tions, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclo-
sure.
81. Id. art. 6, at 45.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 7, at 45-46.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 8, at 46.
87. Id. (which means again the possibility to initiate an annulment procedure ac-
cording to art. 230 EC).
88. Id. art. 8(1, 3).
89. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 41, O.J. C 364/1,
at 18 (2000).
90. Id. art. 42, at 19.
91. Art. 11-101 is tided the "Right to good administration" and paragraph I states
"[elvery person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and
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tence of a Community subject to the rule of law possessing legal
characteristics articulated and developed in the case law of the
ECJ.12 Accordingly, the right to good administration includes:
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual
measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken; (b)
the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while
respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of pro-
fessional and business secrecy; (c) the obligation of the adminis-
tration to give reasons for its decisions.93
Therefore, the right to good administration encompasses
the rights to have one's affairs handled impartially and fairly and
within a reasonable period of time; the right to be heard before
any individual measure is taken that would affect the citizen ad-
versely; the right of access to his or her file; the obligation of the
administration to give reasons for its decisions and, inherent in
transparency, the right of access to documents. 94
Article 111-398 of the Constitutional Treaty, furthermore,
confirms the EU's commitment to a good administration.9 5 It
could eventually, should the Constitution ever enter into force,
within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union."
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution of Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C 310/1, art. II-
101, at 56 (2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
92. See generally Jean-Louis Burban v. European Parliament, Case C-255/90, [1992]
E.C.R. 1-2253; Detlef N61le v. Council of the European Union, Case T-167/94, [1995]
E.C.R. 11-2589; New Europe Consulting v. Commission of the European Communities,
Case T-231/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2403). The wording for that right in the first two
paragraphs results from the case law. See Union Nationale des Entraineurs et Cadres
Techniques Professionnels du Football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens, Case 222/86,
[1987] E.C.R. 4097; Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 374/
87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283; Technische Universitait Mitnchen v. Hauptzollamt Miinchen-
Mitte, Case C-269/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5469; Lisrestal-Organiza :Ao Gestdo de
Restaurantes Colectivos Lda v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-450/
93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-1177; Detlef N61le v. Council of the European, Case T-167/94,
[1995] E.C.R. 11-2589.
93. Moreover, every person has the right to have the Union make good any dam-
age caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States ( 3)
and every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of
the Constitution and must have an answer in the same language ( 4). Draft Constitu-
tional Treaty, supra note 91, art. 11-101, O.J. C 310/1 at 56 (2004); see also EC Treaty,
supra note 3, art. 253, O.J. C 325/33, at 56 (2002).
94. Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 91, art. 11-102, O.J. C 310/1 at 56
(2004).
95. Id. art. 111-398(1) (stating "[i]n carrying out their missions, the institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient
and independent European administration").
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provide the legal basis for a European law on good administra-
tion.
The right of access to documents was incorporated in Arti-
cle 11-102 of the Constitutional Treaty, the latter provision being
nearly verbatim identical to that of Article 255 EC on which it is
based.9 6 However, Article 11-102 extends the right of access to
"documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of
the Union, whatever their medium," whereas Article 255 EC only
guarantees the right of access to documents of the European
Parliament, Council, and Commission.
2.3.3 Case Law of the ECJ
In a 1999 Article, Transparency-Not Just a Vogue Word, ECJ
President Vesterdorf examined developments relating to trans-
parency.9" Evidently, the Court of First Instance ("CFI") had al-
ready built up a considerable amount of case law during the pe-
riod of application of the Code of Conduct (1993-2001),9" the
predecessor of Regulation 1049/2001. This case law, which has
been partly codified in the new Regulation, reflects the Courts'
favorable disposition towards openness and a willingness to
broadly interpret decisions on access. 99
In Netherlands v. Council, the ECJ ruled that there had been
"a progressive affirmation of individuals' right of access to docu-
ments held by public authorities, a right which has been reaf-
firmed at Community level on various occasions, in particular in
96. "The right guaranteed in this Article is the right guaranteed by Art. 255 of the
EC Treaty. In accordance with Art. 52(2) of the Charter, it applies under the conditions
defined by the Treaty." Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union -
Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in
CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50, Note from the Praesidium, 11/10/2000, CHARTE
4473/00, CONVENT 49, p.37.
97. See generally Bo Vesterdorf, Transparency-Not Just a Vogue Word, FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 902 (1999).
98. See Code of Conduct, supra note 74, OJ. L 340/41, at 41 (1993). On Decem-
ber 6, 1993, the Council and the Commission approved a Code of Conduct concerning
public access to Council and Commission Documents aimed at establishing the princi-
ples governing access to the documents they hold. In order to put that commitment
into effect, the Council adopted Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public
access to Council documents. See Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993
on public access to council documents, OJ. L 340, at 43 (1993).
99. See, e.g., Netherlands v. Council, Case C-58/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2169. Ves-
terdorf quotes the Advocate General Tesauro who pointed out that the right of access
to information is "an expression of the democratic principle" and that exceptions
should be interpreted narrowly.
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Declaration 17 on the right of access to information annexed to
the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), which
links that right with the democratic nature of the institutions." l" °
While the Court thus recognized the existence of a "trend"
towards a progressive affirmation of individuals' rights of access
to documents held by public authorities as a constitutional or
legislative principle, it refrained, nonetheless, from establishing
a general principle of access to documents in this case or in sub-
sequent rulings."0 '
In Hautala v. Council,'°2 the ECJ upheld the CFI's affirma-
tion of jurisdiction even though the case involved documents of
the second pillar of the TEU. The fact that the requested report
came under Title V of the TEU was held to leave the jurisdiction
of the Court unaffected. As the Court had already held in Sven-
skaJournalistf6rbundet, Decision 93/731 (which preceded Regula-
tion 1049/2001) applied to all Council documents, irrespective
of their content.'0 3 It also held that, under the former Article
J.11 (1) TEU (now Article 28 EU), acts adopted according to the
former Article 151(3) EC (now Article 207(3) EC), which pro-
vided the legal basis for Decision 93/731, were applicable to
measures within the scope of Title V of the EU Treaty. 1 4 There-
fore, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, documents re-
lating to Title V of the TEU fell within the scope of Decision 93/
731. Thus, the fact that under former Article L (now Article 46
EU) the CFI did not have jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of
acts falling within Title V of the TEU, was no reason to exclude
its jurisdiction to rule on public access to those acts.10 5
As to the merits, the Court of Justice pointed out that the
public must have the widest possible access to the documents
held by the Commission and the Council and rejected the Coun-
100. Id. 11 35, 36.
101. See id.; Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, Case C-41/00 P, [2003] E.C.R. 1-02125, 1 38-40; Mara Messina v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Case T-76/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11-03203, 56; see
generally Co-Frutta Soc. Coop. RI v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-
47/01 [2003] OJ 2004 C7/31.
102. See Hautala v. Council, Case T 14/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2492; Council v.
Hautala, Case C-353/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9565, 1 123.
103. See Hautala, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9565, 84.
104. See id. 1 38.
105. See SvenskaJournalistfdrbundet v. Council, Case T-174/95, [1998] E.C.R. II-
2289, 1 85-86.
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cil's argument that Decision 93/731 concerns only access to
"documents" as such, not to the items of information contained
in them.1" 6 The Court found that the refusal of partial access
constitutes a disproportionate measure of protection of the
items of information covered by the exceptions in the deci-
sion.10 7 Instead of refusing access to the entire report, the Coun-
cil could have attained the protective aims pursued if it had con-
fined itself to censoring only those passages in the report which
could harm international relations.' °8 Consequently, the Court
ofJustice upheld the decision of the CFI, and concluded that the
Council may not systematically limit the public's right of access
to documents.'0 9 When exceptions listed in the codes of con-
duct of the Council and the Commission are invoked, the possi-
bility of partial disclosure must be considered.
In Mattila v. Council and Commission,"' the applicant re-
quested documents in the field of international relations that
had been adopted in the framework of the first pillar. The CFI
found that the Council and the Commission had not considered
the possibility of granting partial access to the documents re-
quested by the applicant."' The ECJ annulled the judgment of
the CFI in so far as it dismissed Mattila's form of order seeking
annulment of the contested decisions.1 2 According to the ECJ,
the Council and Commission are obliged under Decisions 93/
731 and 94/90, and in accordance with the principle of propor-
tionality, to examine whether partial access should be granted to
the information not covered by the exceptions. Where no ex-
ception is applicable, a decision refusing access to a document
would have to be annulled as being vitiated by an error of law. 1 3
In Kuijer v. Council,4 the CFI held that public access to
documents of the institutions is to be granted as a matter of prin-
ciple, whereas the power to refuse access is to be exercised only
106. See Hautala, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9565, 1 91-94.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. 7 108-17.
110. See generally Mattila v. Council and Commission, Case T-204/99, [2001] E.C.R.
11-2265.
111. See id. at 71.
112. See id. at 112.
113. See id. at 30.
114. See Kuijer v. Council, Case T-211/00, [2002] E.C.R. 11-485, 55.
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exceptionally." 5 However, the risk of a protected interest being
undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hy-
pothetical. 6
In Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities,"7 the ECJ referred for the first time to the new
Regulation 1049/2001, even though the Commission's contested
decision had been adopted before the entry into force of that
Regulation. The ECJ observed that "the developments in the
Community legal framework after the adoption of the contested
decision," confirmed the importance of that right [right of ac-
cess to documents].11 It also referred to Article 255(1) EC,
which was inserted into the Community legal order by the Treaty
of Amsterdam and "provides that [a]ny citizen of the Union, and
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered of-
fice in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European
Parliament, Council and Commission documents." '19 Further-
more, the ECJ held that Regulation 1049/2001 "lays down the
principles and conditions for exercising that right in order to
enable citizens to participate more closely in the decision-mak-
ing process, to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the
citizen in a democratic system and to contribute to strengthen-
ing the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental
rights."1120
In the case of Verein fir Konsumenteninformation v. Commis-
sion,12' both the request for access to documents and the subse-
quent application for annulment before the CFI were already
based on the procedure contained in Regulation 1049/2001.
The Verein fir Konsumenteninformation ("VKI"), an Austrian con-
sumers' association, requested authorization from the Commis-
sion to consult the administrative file relating to the "Lombard
Club decision," in which the Commission had found that several
115. Id. 55.
116. See Id. 56.
117. Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Case C-41/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-02125.
118. See id. 39
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Verein ffir Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, Case T-2/03, [2005]
E.C.R. 11-1121.
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Austrian banks had participated in a cartel. 122 By letter of Sep-
tember 12, 2002, the Commission, basing its decision on Regula-
tion 1049/2001, rejected the VKI's request in its entirety. It also
rejected the VKI's confirmatory request based on Article 7(2) of
that Regulation.
The CFI held that an institution's refusal to examine con-
cretely and individually the documents covered by a request for
access constitutes a manifest breach of the principle of propor-
tionality.1 23 However, it also held that in exceptional cases, in
particular when a concrete and individual examination would
entail an unreasonable amount of work, an institution must re-
tain the right to balance the interest in public access to docu-
ments against the burden of work involved in providing access to
them. 124 The CFI referred to the concrete, individual examina-
tion of the documents referred to in a request for access under
Regulation 1049/2001 as constituting one of the elementary du-
ties of an institution in response to such a request.125 As in
Kuijer,126 the CFI reiterated that public access to documents of
the institutions is to be considered the primary approach as a
matter of principle, while the power to refuse access is the excep-
tion to that principle,1 27 which, as such must, therefore, be inter-
preted strictly.'22 The CFI concluded that the right of access to
documents is a substantive right embedded in the Treaty (Article
255 EC) as well as in the Constitutional Treaty (Article 11-102
and Article 111-399 CT), and enforceable before the CFI or the
Ombudsman when infringed. By contrast, the right of "access to
the file" is a right accessory to the antitrust procedure. Only in
the context of the rights of the defense in such procedure can
that right be raised as a fundamental procedural guarantee. It
can only be enforced by action for annulment against the final
decision of the Commission in such competition cases. 129
In a more recent case, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v.
122. Id. 7 1-3.
123. Id. I 100.
124. See id. It 101-103; see also Hautala, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2492, 62.
125. See Vereinfifr Konsumenteninformation, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 7 104.
126. Kuijer v. Council, Case T-211/00, [2002] E.C.R. 11-485.
127. See VereinfiirKonsumenteninformation, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 105.
128. Id. 1 106.
129. Verein flir Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, CASE T-2/03 [2006]
C.M.L.R. 43, 1 205.
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Commission, the CFI basically repeated its VKI-decision."'
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, a German company, was
formed in 1994 with the aim of taking over some glass produc-
tion of the former Ilmenauer Glaswerke GmbH, a company
which had been wound up. In December 1998, Germany noti-
fied the Commission of various measures designed to consoli-
date the financial position of the Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau
GmbH, including a partial waiver of the payment of the
purchase price of the glass production and a loan granted by the
German Bundesland of Thuringia.'31 In the course of a formal
investigation under Article 88(2) EC concerning the payment
waiver and the loan, the Commission obtained additional infor-
mation from Schott Glas, a competitor of the applicant. By Deci-
sion 2002/185/EC on State aid implemented by Germany for
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH of June 12, 2001, the
Commission determined that the payment waiver was inconsis-
tent with the conduct of a private investor and constituted State
aid incompatible with the common market. 13 2 Furthermore, the
Commission opened a second formal investigation procedure
pursuant to Article 88(2) EC.' By appeal of March 2002, based
on Regulation 1049/2001, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau
GmbH applied for "access to all the documents in the Commis-
sion's files in all the aid cases concerning [it] and in particular
in aid case C 44/2001 as well as to all the documents in the Com-
mission's files concerning the State aid for the undertaking
Schott Glas."'1 4 The Commission rejected the application on
the grounds that the documents sought were covered by the ex-
ception in Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001, referring in
particular to the possibility to refuse access to a document where
disclosure would undermine the protection of the purpose of
inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overrid-
ing public interest in disclosure.' 35 Interestingly, the applicant
had invoked a right of access to documents, which is "not an
ordinary secondary right but is, on the contrary, in view of 'the
130. See Technische Glaswerke lhnenau GmbH v. Commission, Case T-237/02,
[2006] E.C.R. 00, 74-100.
131. See id. 1 2.
132. See id. 16.
133. This investigation was conducted under reference C 44/2001.
134. See Technische 5.
135. Id. 10.
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democratic principle,' a fundamental right, derogation from
which must be construed strictly."' 36 The Court found that "the
mere fact that a document concerns an interest protected by an
exception cannot justify the application of that exception."13 7
Such application may, in principle, be justified only if the institu-
tion has previously assessed, firstly, whether access to the docu-
ment would specifically and actually undermine the protected
interest and, secondly, in the circumstances referred to in Article
4(2) and (3) of Regulation 1049/2001, whether there was no
overriding public interest in disclosure.3 8 The Court also recal-
led its reasoning in Kuijer that the risk of a protected interest
being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not
purely hypothetical.3 9 Consequently, the examination which
the institution must, in principle, undertake in order to apply an
exception, must be carried out in a concrete manner and must
be apparent from the reasons for the decision.14 ° The Court
concluded that the complaint based on the lack of a concrete,
individual examination of the documents referred to in the ap-
plication for access had to be upheld and that the Commission's
pure and simple refusal of access to the applicant was, conse-
quently, vitiated by an error of law. Therefore, the Court found
that the Commission had infringed Article 4(2) of Regulation
1049/200.141
By way of conclusion, one can say that since 1999 the right
of access to documents has been embedded in the EC-Treaty,
secondary law, as well as explicitly recognized by the Court. 14 2
Access to documents may only exceptionally be refused, 143 and
such exceptions are to be interpreted restrictively.' 44 The mere
fact that a document concerns an interest protected by an excep-
tion does not as such justify the application of such an excep-
136. Id. 27.
137. Id. 77; see also Denkavit Nederland v. Commission, Case T-20/99 [2000]
E.C.R. II 3011, 45.
138. Technische, 77.
139. See Kuijer v. Council, Case T-211/00 [2002] E.C.R. 11-485, 1 56.
140. Technische, 77; see also Hautala v. Council, Case T-14/98, [1999] E.C.R. II-
2489, 67; Kuijer, [2000] E.C.R. 11-1959, 38; Verein ffir Konsumenteninformation v.
Commission, Case T-2/03, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 24, 69, 74.
141. Technische, 100.
142. Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v. Commission, Case C-41/00 P, [2003] E.C.R. I-
02125, 39.
143. Kuijer, [2002] E.C.R. 11-485, 55.
144. Verein fir Konsumenteninformation [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 105.
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tion. "'45 A concrete, case-by-case individual examination is an el-
ementary duty of a concerned institution. 46 An institution's re-
fusal to carry out such an examination of the documents covered
by a request for access constitutes manifest breach of the princi-
ple of proportionality. 4 7 Only when such an examination would
entail an unreasonable amount of work, would an institution be
entitled to balance the interest in public access to documents
against the burden of work involved. 41
3. TRANSPARENCY IN THE WTO
Good governance as a concept is scarcely present in the
WTO legal framework, unlike as was seen above, in the EU's le-
gal framework.
Elements of good governance can, however, be found in
Section 2 of Part III of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") on Civil and Adminis-
trative Procedures and Remedies. According to these detailed
provisions regarding civil and administrative proceedings, WTO
Members are obliged to guarantee certain judicial rights, in par-
ticular fair and equitable judicial procedures for enforcing intel-
lectual property rights. 4 ' These requirements, however, do not
guarantee individual rights, but merely require Members to en-
sure that national intellectual property rights ("IPR") proceed-
ings are organized and conducted in accordance with a mini-
mum standard. Thus, this implicit reference to good govern-
ance entails obligations for WTO Members. On the other hand,
"transparency" does play an important role in WTO law, being
defined as the "degree to which trade policies and practices, and
the process by which they are established, are open and predict-
145. Technische, 77.
146. Id. 85.
147. Vereinfiir Konsumenteninformation, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 100.
148. Hautala v. Council, Case T-14/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2489, 86; see also Verein
firKonsumenteninformation, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 101.
149. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994), pt. III, § 1, art. 42. [hereinafter TRIPS]. WTO Members shall pro-
vide fair and equitable civil judicial procedures for enforcing intellectual property
rights, including timely written notice, representation by independent legal counsel,
right to substantiate claims and present all relevant evidence.
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able." ' 5' According to a definition by the Committee on Trade
and Environment, the function of WTO transparency provisions
is to "support the proper functioning of the multilateral trading
system, by helping to prevent unnecessary trade restriction and
distortion from occurring, by providing information about mar-
ket opportunities and by helping to avoid trade disputes from
arising."''
As in the case of the EU legal framework, one can distin-
guish between an internal and an external dimension of trans-
parency. However, the actual meaning of these two terms is dif-
ferent from the EU's understanding of internal and external
transparency. Internal transparency in the WTO context means
equal access to WTO negotiations and decisions by all Members,
and in particular the transparency of the WTO decision-making
process to its Members.1 5 2 External transparency, by contrast,
refers to public and citizens' access to information about WTO
procedures and decisions. Especially since the Seattle Ministe-
rial Conference, the WTO has made considerable efforts to im-
prove both external and internal transparency.
Furthermore, there are a number of provisions of WTO
Agreements that require transparency of domestic laws and reg-
ulations. These will be examined below.
3.1 Article X GATT
3.1.1 Doctrinal Views
According to Steve Charnovitz, one of the most positive but
least known features of WTO law is the rule requiring national
governments to publish laws, regulations, judicial decisions and
administrative rulings affecting trade.' 53 Robert Howse, too, ac-
knowledges the potentially democracy-enhancing effect of the
provisions of Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), while rightly pointing out that Article X GATT
150. WTO Glossary, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/glossary-e/glossary-
e.htm.
151. Furthermore, the importance of the full transparency of national environ-
mental policy measures, such as labelling and packaging requirements, in order not to
create unnecessary trade restrictions is pointed out in WTO, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
AT THE WTO 44 (April 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envir-e/envir_
wto2004_e.pdf.
152. Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and Cosmopolitics, 7J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 675, 678.
153. Id.
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had been given relatively little attention so far. 154
The origins of the GAfT must be seen against the back-
ground of the post-World War II situation, in which the GATT
"provided rules to buffer or interface between the international
objective of sustained liberalization and the objectives of domes-
tic policy.' 55 By imposing notification obligations on con-
tracting parties, Article X GATT aimed at ensuring transparency
of and trust in the new international trade order.
Article X GATT had been adapted from the 1946 U.S. Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act ("APA").' 5 6 When GATT entered
into force in 1947, it "grandfathered" the existing legal systems
of GATT Contracting Parties.
157
However, the notification requirement under Article X
GATT has never been enforced, and its provisions, therefore,
have long been viewed as weak and ineffective. Although it was
frequently cited in dispute settlement proceedings and in com-
plaints, violations of Article X GATT have typically been pleaded
only as "add-ons" to other more promising legal claims of viola-
tions of WTO rules. WTO and GATT panels have habitually re-
fused to rule on Article X claims where a measure has already
been found to violate another, more substantive GATT or WTO
obligation. 158
3.1.2 Panel Practice
In Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, the United States
argued, as a subsidiary matter, that Japan had also nullified or
impaired benefits under Articles II, X:I, X(3) and XIII(3)
154. Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think about the "Democratic Deficit" in the WIO, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 91 (Stefan
Griller ed., 2003).
155. SYLVIA OSTRY, EXTERNAL TRANSPARENCY" THE POLICY PROCESS AT THE NATIONAL
LEVEL OF THE Two LEVEL GAME, 3-4 (2002).
156. Id. at 3.
157. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-]1, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. X [hereinafter GATT]. Paragraph 3(c) of Art. X provides:
The provisions of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the
elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a con-
tracting party on the date of this Agreement which in fact provide for an ob-
jective and impartial review of administrative action even though such proce-
dures are not fully or formally independent of the agencies entrusted with
administration enforcement.
158. Warren Maruyama, The WITO: Domestic Regulation and the Challenge of Shaping
Trade, 37 INT'L L. 677, 677 (2003).
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GATT. 159 Typically, however, in view of the findings that the im-
port quotas violated Article XI GATT, the Panel found it unnec-
essary to make a finding on these matters. 6 °
In Indonesia-Autos, the Panel had to examine whether a se-
ries of measures taken by Indonesia to develop its domestic auto-
mobile industry was inconsistent with Article X as well as with
Articles I and III GATT.'61 The Panel found that the Indonesian
National Car Program violated the provisions of Article I and/or
Article III of GATT and did not, therefore, consider it necessary
to examine Japan's claims under Article X GATT.'6 2
Similarly, in Argentina-Hides and Leather,'6 3 the EC invoked
Article X GATT, among claims of violations of other provisions,
but this time the Panel made some essential clarifications of the
interpretation of Article X(3) (a) GATT.164 It emphasized the
concept of "uniformity" relating to the requirement in Article
X(3) (a) GATT that laws and regulations shall be administered
"in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." '165 It also
ruled that the provision of Article X(3) (a) should "not be read
as a broad anti-discrimination provision" but that it required
"uniform administration of Customs laws and procedures be-
tween individual shippers and even with respect to the same per-
son at different times and different places." 166
The first case in which Article X GATT played a central role
is that of EC-Selected Customs Matters,'6 7 in which the United States
complained of various deficiencies in the EC administration of
customs laws and regulations, particularly in the area of the clas-
159. Report of the Panel,Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, 7 26, 28, 30 & 57,
L/5623-31S/94 (May 15-16, 1984), GATT 31 B.I.S.D. 94.
160. Id. 57; see generally Report of the Panel, Republic of Korea-Restrictions on Im-
ports of Beef-Complaint by the United States, L/6505-36S/268 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT
B.I.S.D. 36S/286; Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, (Dec. 5,
1989), 36 B.I.S.D. at 68, 92.
161. See generally Report of the Panel, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Auto-
mobile Industry, VW7T/DS54/R,VA7T/DS55/R,WT /DS59/R,WT/DS64/R, (2 July 1998).
162. See id.
163. Report of the Panel, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and
the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R, (Dec. 19, 2000). The provisions invoked
were GATT Arts. 111(2), X, XI and XX.
164. Id. 71 10.3-10.12.
165. Id. It 10.5-10.6.
166. Id. 1 11.81-11.84.
167. Panel Report, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/R
June 16, 2006).
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sification and valuation of products for customs purposes, as well
as of the EC's failure to institute tribunals or procedures for the
prompt review and correction of administrative action in cus-
toms matters. The United States claimed that this non-uniform
administration by the EC resulted in disparate administration
among EC Member States in a number of respects, including
differences in the classification and valuation of goods and in
the implementation of appeals procedures. 6 ' Furthermore, the
ability to obtain review of a customs decision by a tribunal of the
EC is possible only after a review by national administrative or
judicial tribunals.' 69
The United States considered the aforementioned practice
to be inconsistent with the EC's obligations under Articles X:I,
X(3) (a) and (b) of GATT 1994.170 The Panel found that the EC
had partially violated Article X(3)(a) GATT, namely in three
cases involving tariff classification and customs valuation. How-
ever, in five cases in the areas of tariff classification, customs val-
uation, and customs procedures, the EC had not violated Article
X(3) (a) GATT, and in 11 cases the US had not been able to
show that the EC had violated this provision. 7t
Concerning the interpretation of Article X(3) (a) GATT, 172
the Panel found that the term "administer" relates to the appli-
cation of laws and regulations, but not to laws and regulations as
such.1 73 Regarding the interpretation of "uniformity," the Panel
noted that there was no single general concept of uniformity
and that uniformity must be ensured within a reasonable period
of time that should not fall below certain procedural minimum
standards. 174 Based on these findings, the Panel concluded that
the United States had failed to establish a violation of Article
X(3) (a) in 16 out of the 19 particular instances of alleged viola-
tions. Concerning the interpretation of Article X(3) (b), the
Panel found that the EC had not acted inconsistently with the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. GATT, supra note 159, art. X(3) (a). GATT provides: "Each contracting party
shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article."
173. Panel Report, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, supra note 167,
at 7.114.
174. Id. 1 7.128 f.
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requirements of Article X(3) (b) of the GATT 1994. Article
X(3) (b) of the GATT 1994 would not necessarily mean that the
decisions of the judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
review procedures "must govern the practice of all the agencies
entrusted with administrative enforcement throughout the territory
of a particular [WTO] Member.' '1 75
On appeal by the United States on certain issues of law and
legal interpretations developed by the Panel, the AB partially re-
versed the Panel's findings.'7 6 Regarding the requirement of
uniform administration in Article X(3) (a) GATT, the AB re-
versed the Panel's finding that Article X(3) (a) of the GATT 1994
only relates to the application of laws and regulations, but not to
laws and regulations as such. Instead, the AB found that legal
instruments that regulate the application or implementation of
laws, regulations, decisions, and administrative rulings of the
kind described in Article X(1) of the GATT 1994 can be chal-
lenged under Article X(3) (a).' 77
With respect to the review mechanisms for administrative
action relating to customs matters, the AB upheld the Panel's
finding that Article X(3) (b) of the GATT 1994 does not require
that first instance review decisions must govern the practice of
all the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement
throughout the territory of a particular WTO Member. 7 The AB
reversed the Panel's finding that the United States was pre-
cluded from challenging certain instruments of the EC's cus-
toms legislation listed in the request for the establishment of a
panel as a whole or overall. 7  However, the AB was unable to
complete the analysis on this claim because the Panel's "general
observations" about the role of a number of institutions and
mechanisms in the EC provided an insufficient factual basis for
assessing whether the EC had failed to ensure uniform adminis-
tration of its customs legislation. The AB upheld the Panel's
conclusion that the EC did not breach Article X(3) (b) of the
GATT 1994. 180
Article X GATT is not, of course the only provision in the
175. Id. 7.496, 7.539, 7.554, 7.556 & 8.1(e).
176. Panel Report, European Communities - Selected Customs Matters, supra note 167.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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WTO legal framework which contains notification obligations.
Also Article XVII(4) GATT states notification requirements for
state trading enterprises,' but provisions establishing notifica-
tion requirements can be found in numerous agreements, un-
derlining the central importance of notification obligations for
the world trade system.
3.2 Other Arguments
3.2.1 Transparency Through Notification Obligations in
Other Agreements
Article VI ("Domestic Regulation") of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services ("GATS") builds on Article X GATT.
It states that "all measures of general application affecting trade
in services must be administered in a reasonable, objective, and
uniform manner" (paragraph 1);182 and requires WTO Members
to establish 'judicial, arbitral, or administration tribunals" for
prompt review of and appropriate remedies for administrative
decisions affecting trade in services (paragraph 2).183 The GATS
Council, furthermore, formulates disciplines to ensure that regu-
latory decisions regarding an applicant's qualifications to pro-
vide a service shall be based on "objective and transparent crite-
ria"'84 (paragraph 4).
Under the title "Transparency," Article 7 of the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) imposes a notifi-
cation obligation upon WTO Members concerning their sanitary
or phytosanitary measures.' 85 The Anti-Dumping Agreement
("AD") contains several notification obligations, concerning, in-
ter alia, the investigation of dumping (Article 5 AD), and the no-
tification of an application to initiate an investigation to the gov-
181. GATT, supra note 157, art. XVII, 4(a) (stating "[c]ontracting parties shall no-
tify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the products which are imported into or ex-
ported from their territories by enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of
this article.")
182. GATT, supra note 157, art. VI.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. "Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and
shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance
with the provisions of Annex B". Agreement on the Application of SANITARY AND
PHYOSANITARY MEASURES, Apr. 15, 1994, Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods,
Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[Art. 7 SPS].
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ernment of the exporting Member concerned (Article 5.5
AD). 186
Article 8.3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures ("SCM") imposes notification requirements re-
lating to non-actionable subsidies which are also available
through the WTO website ("Documents online").187 Concerning
specific subsidies, Article 25.1 of the SCM Agreement requires
that all Members submit a new and full notification of all specific
subsidies every three years, with updating notifications due in
the intervening years. 88 This notification obligation extends to
all specific subsidies related to goods, in any sector (including
agriculture), and provided by any level of government (e.g., na-
tional, regional, state or provincial, local). 8 9 Article 12 of the
Safeguards Agreement ("SG") envisages notification and consul-
tation requirements relating to safeguard measures. A notifica-
tion obligation on the establishment of enquiry/contact points is
foreseen in Article 111(4) GATS 9 ° as well as in Article 62
TRIPS.'91
Further notification obligations can be found, inter alia, in
Articles 3 and 4 TRIPS, in Article 5.1 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS"), in the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement ("GPA") (Article
XXIV(5) ),192 the International Dairy Agreement (Article III,
186. Other notification obligations are: the notification of information required by
the authorities in an investigation of dumping to all interested parties in the framework
of evidentiary rules (Art.6 AD) and the notification to all interested parties of essential
facts under consideration (Art. 6.9 AD). Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping), April 15, 1994
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A.
187. In order to assist the public in identifying and retrieving these documents, a
discussion of some of the main types of notifications submitted to the SCM Committee
and the document series in which they may be located is provided below.
188. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA.
189. Id.
190. Art. III requires a Member to notify to the Services Council, at least once a
year, any new laws or regulations which significantly affect trade in sectors where that
Member has scheduled specific commitments. In introducing such regulatory changes,
a Member must act consistently with its legal obligations under the GATS. The notifica-
tion obligation enables other Members to verify that this is the case.
191. In September 1995, the TRIPS Council adopted a common procedure for the
notification of contact points that Members had established for the purposes of Art. 69.
192. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 4(b), art. XXIV, 5.
(b) Each Party shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and
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VI(4)), the Import Licensing Procedures Agreement (Article
1.4, 1.5), and in the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (Ar-
ticle 5). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
("TBT") sets out special notification requirements. Technical
regulations and product standards are subject to the TBT re-
quirement that the measures are notified to WTO Members, that
they are applied in a non-discriminatory way, and that they are
not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve their objec-
tive.
There is also a Working Group on Notification Obligations
and Procedures, which reports to the Council for Trade and
Goods on an annual basis.' 93
3.2.2 Transparency Provisions in WTO Agreements
References to transparency are in a manner of speaking
ubiquitous within the legal framework of the WTO. Provisions
explicitly referring to the term "transparency" and provisions on
notification obligations are closely linked to each other and can
not, therefore, always be separated from one another. This can
be seen for example in Article 12 AD, which is referred to as a
"transparency" provision in the GATT Analytical Index, but
which, under the title Public Notice and Explanation of Determina-
tions, contains a notification obligation. However, the fact that
public notice should also be given to other interested parties is
at the same time an important contribution to transparency.
Under the heading "Transparency," Article III GATS obliges
the Members to publish promptly and at the latest by the time of
their entry into force, "all relevant measures of general applica-
tion which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agree-
ment".194 International agreements pertaining to or affecting
trade in services to which a Member is a signatory shall also be
published. 19 5 Moreover, each member has to inform the Coun-
regulations relevant to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws
and regulations.
193. This Working Group was established by the Council for Trade in Goods on 20
February 1995, pursuant to Part III of the Ministerial Decision on Notification Proce-
dures in Marrakesh.
194. World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB,
Art. 111(]), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, art. III [hereinafter GATS].
195. See id. art. 111(1).
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cil of Trade in Services at least once a year of the introduction of
"any new, or any changes to existing, laws, regulations or admin-
istrative guidelines which significantly affect trade in services cov-
ered by its specific commitments under this Agreement. "196 Fur-
thermore, as already mentioned above, Article IV(4) GATS sets
out some notification requirements and envisages the establish-
ment of contact and enquiry points, a clear illustration of the
linkage between transparency and notification obligations."'
The GPA seeks to open up government contracts for goods
and services through "transparency of laws, regulations, proce-
dures and practices regarding government procurement" '198 and,
to that end, incorporates a number of specific obligations.199
3.3 Transparency in Dispute Settlement
Transparency also plays an important role in the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Mechanism ("DSU"). Among several provisions
that aim at ensuring a transparent procedure, Article 18.2 DSU
requires that a summary of confidentially submitted submissions
of a party to a dispute be disclosed to the public upon request of
a Member.2 0 0 However, there is an exception to the rule of Arti-
196. See id. art. 111(3).
197. See id. art. IV(4).
198. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 103.
199. These comprise obligations regarding: (1) tendering procedures; (2) qualifi-
cation of suppliers; (3) timely publication of any conditions for participation; (4) publi-
cation of invitations for participation in proposed procurements; (5) "fair and non-
discriminatory" selection procedures; (6) adequate time limits and deadlines; (7) sub-
mission, receipt, and opening of tenders "under procedures and conditions guarantee-
ing the regularity of the openings"; (8) contracts must be awarded to the entity deter-
mined to be "fully capable of undertaking the contract" and which is either the lowest
bidder or offers the "most advantageous" tender; and (9) transparency of terms and
conditions. See Maruyama, supra note 158, at 687.
200. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (stating
Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as
confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing
in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing state-
ments of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential
information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body
which that Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall
also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the
information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the
public." Appendix 3 reads "[w] here a party to a dispute submits a confidential
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cle 18.2: The classification of information as business confiden-
tial information ("BCI").2 " 1 This exception has been invoked
quite frequently by WTO Members, prompting Panels and the
AB to clarify the exact scope and the limits of the exception of
business confidential information.
In Canada-Aircraft, the Panel adopted special Procedures
Governing Business Confidential Information ("BCI") that went
beyond the protection afforded by Article 18.2 of the DSU, but
Canada declined to submit BCI under the revised Procedures
because they did not provide the requisite level of protection. 20 2
The Panel stated that in its view, the final Procedures would
"strike a reasonable balance between (1) the need for 'reasona-
ble access' to BCI by the Panel and the other disputing parties,
and (2) the need to provide private business interests with ade-
quate protection for their proprietary business information. 20 3
In Canada-Aircraft and Brazil-Aircraft, the AB made a pre-
liminary ruling that it was not necessary to adopt additional pro-
cedures to protect business confidential information in the ap-
pellate proceedings, but that the existing provisions concerning
confidentiality of dispute settlement proceedings were suffi-
cient.20 4
In its final ruling in Canada-Aircraft, the AB stated that the
provisions of Articles 17.10 and 18.2 DSU apply to all Members
of the WTO, and that they furthermore oblige them to maintain
the confidentiality of any submissions or information they have
submitted or received in an AB proceeding. 2"5 Finally the AB
concluded that it did not consider it necessary to adopt addi-
tional procedures for the protection of business confidential in-
formation in these appellate proceedings."2°6
In EC-Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 - EC), the United
States requested the Arbitrators to establish procedures for the
version of its written submissions to the panel, it shall also, upon request of a
Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in
its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.)
201. See id.
202. Report of the Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
203. Id. 9.68.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. 145, 147; see also Panel Report, Brazil - Export FinancingProgrammefjor
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, (Aug. 2, 1999), 123, 125.
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handling of business confidential information.2"' The United
States proposed to establish a system of BCI: regular BCI and
super BCI. 2 8 The EC objected to this proposal, arguing that
working procedures on confidentiality should not be adopted on
a case-by-case basis.20 9 The Arbitrators agreed with the United
States that special rules were justified in light of the type of infor-
mation involved, but did not in the end accept the need for spe-
cial treatment of super BCI.
210
Besides Article 18(2) DSU, transparency is also guaranteed
by other DSU provisions. Thus, Article 4 (4) DSU requires noti-
fication of the WTO Secretariat that Members have entered into
consultations under the DSU.21 1 Moreover, increased trans-
parency can essentially contribute to a more efficient enforce-
ment mechanism, as detailed, and early information about the
merits of a particular case and about policies applied is a precon-
dition for effective enforcement. 21 2
3.4 Does the WVTO Grant Transparency to Individuals?
Although the WTO Agreement imposes many reporting,
notification and transparency requirements upon its Members, it
does not impose similar requirements upon the WTO itself. Un-
like the EC's acquis communautaire, the legal framework of the
WTO does not determine openness and transparency as funda-
mental principles of trade law, and no right to information is
granted to individuals. However, there is one exception that can
be found in Article 18.2 and in Annex 3 of the DSU, which states
that a summary of confidentially submitted submissions of a
207. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importa-
tion, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999).
208. See id. Regular BCI was described as company-specific information that was
non-public and sensitive, but that could be extrapolated from other public and non-
public information available to governments and the company's competitors. Super
BCI was described as non-public, sensitive company-specific information that could not
be so extrapolated.
209. See id.
210. See id. 2.2.-2.5.
211. See DSU, supra note 202, art. 4.4, (providing that "[a]ll such requests for con-
sultations shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees by the
Member which requests consultations. Any request for consultations shall be submitted
in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the
measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint.")
212. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WFO Dispute Settlement, Trans-
parency and Surveillence, 23 WORLD ECON. 527, 540 (2000).
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party to a dispute has to be disclosed to the public upon request
of a Member.213 However, practice has not been impressive so
far.21 4 Basically, WNTO external transparency "begins at home,"
stemming from rights and responsibilities of governments, not
of those of individual traders. However, some exceptions to this
rule can be found, for example in the SCM Agreement which
includes the rights of "interested parties" other than those of
Member governments. 215  Consumer groups are specifically
named in the Dumping Agreement.21 6 The Agreement on Safe-
guards includes an obligation for the importing country to carry
out an investigation including "public interest hearings," which
could also include interest groups. Similar provisions are con-
tained in Article 22 TRIPS on the protection of geographical in-
dications and in Article VI GATS on domestic regulation. 2 17 Al-
though these examples do provide some procedural par-
ticipatory rights, for the most part the WTO rules situate the
determination of the policy process in the domestic arena of the
member governments. One major exception is the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism ("TPRM") .218
The TPRM is an important tool aiming at the enhancement
of transparency, which puts trade and related policies under re-
view on a periodic basis in order to ensure significantly greater
transparency of national policies. Through informed public un-
derstanding, the effectiveness of the domestic policy-making pro-
cess should be enhanced. However, Howse has taken the view
that its democratic potential has not been realized because of
the narrow policy perspective adopted in examining Members'
policies and the non-appropriate realization of the potential of
broad civil society input.219 On the other hand, an appropriately
213. See DSU, supra note 202, art. 18.2, annex 3.
214. See Charnovitz, supra note 152, at 679. Charnovitz also characterizes Art. X as
a "good governance" provision whose value has become "better understood as a driver
of development and equity."
215. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14.
216. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994).
217. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401.
218. See Ostry, supra note 155, at 21f.
219. See Howse, supra note 154.
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reformed TPRM could contribute to a greater extent to the en-
hancement of domestic democratic accountability for trade and
related policies.22 °
In general, the GATT/WTO framework can be seen as an
arena where information asymmetries have been severe and the
understanding of trade rules quite poorly developed. 221
Charnovitz has suggested, therefore, that the WTO should take
legislative action to open up to civic legitimacy because openness
would contribute to the enhancement of legitimacy as well as to
greater public support for the WTO's mission. 2 2 2
Some progress has, however, been made since the establish-
ment of the WTO in 1995. Indeed the WA/TO attaches particular
importance to a transparent relationship with NGOs and has
adopted Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with NGOs
in 1996.22' These guidelines were intended to serve as the prin-
cipal foundation upon which the increasing interaction between
the WTO and civil society should be built. Moreover, the WTO
Secretariat hosts regular information briefings for NGOs and
regularly transmits to the WTO Members lists of documents sub-
mitted by NGOs.
3.5 Recent Developments
Among the most significant improvements in the area of ex-
ternal transparency is the WTO website which provides access to
a great variety of documents, including those of Trade Policy Re-
views.
Transparency was also an integral part of the Doha Ministe-
rial Declaration.2 24 Paragraph 10 of the Declaration contains a
commitment to transparency:
Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to en-
sure internal transparency and the effective participation of
all Members. While emphasizing the intergovernmental
220. See id. at 92; see also Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 214, at 527; see also
Ostry, supra note 155, at 22.
221. See Howse, supra note 154, at 92.
222. See Charnovitz, supra note 152, at 679.
223. World Trade Organization General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Re-
lations with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162 (July 18, 1996).
224. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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character of the organization, we are committed to making
the WTO's operations more transparent, including through
more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and
to improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at
the national and multilateral levels continue to promote a
better public understanding of the WTO and to communi-
cate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multilateral trading
system. 225
Transparency in government procurement was also one of the
four so-called "Singapore issues," alongside investment, competi-
tion policy, and trade facilitation. It should be mentioned, lastly,
that in December 2006 the General Council decided to establish
a Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements
("RTA"), in view of the ever increasing numbers of RTAs noti-
fied to the WTO. 2 2
6
FINAL ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK
For both the EU and the WTO, transparency has become
much more than just a vogue word. Despite their considerably
different organizational structures and legal status, both organi-
zations have shown that transparency as a particular aspect of
good governance is not only incumbent upon states but also that
it can and should be guaranteed by international organizations.
However, the European understanding of good governance
as such is still predominantly referring to the external dimension
of good governance, an instrument to ensure the promotion of
human rights and democracy in third (world) countries. In or-
der to guarantee the implementation of the internal dimension
of good governance which embraces the right to good adminis-
trative behavior, the EU-institutions adopted appropriate codes
of conduct. Moreover, the transparency initiative launched by
the European Commission should, over time, also contribute to
the bridging of the confidence gap between the European insti-
tutions and the EU-citizens. Rights of access to documents
225. See id.
226. World Trade Organization Negotiating Group on Rules, Transparency Mecha-
nism of for Regional Trade Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 14, 2006), to be implemented on
a provisional basis in accordance with paragraph 47 of the Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion. WTO General Council, Transparency Mechanism of for Regional Trade Agree-
ments, Decision of 14 December 2006, WT/L/671, to be implemented on a provisional
basis in accordance with paragraph 47 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
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which directly affect citizens' rights have also been enhanced,
regulated by secondary legislation and sanctioned by the ECJ
and CF. While good governance is only of minor importance in
the WTO legal framework, transparency has a particular role to
play in the international trade order, as is, inter alia, amply illus-
trated by numerous notification obligations contained in various
WTO agreements, as well as by its regular promotion since the
establishment of the WTO, including the recent decision on a
transparency mechanism for RTAs.
Whether transparency can be further strengthened in their
respective legal frameworks will depend on general develop-
ments, such as the still uncertain future of the Constitutional
Treaty and the outcome of multilateral negotiations in the Doha
Development Round. Both organizations have, however, already
made considerable progress in securing transparency, whether
as a considerable right (EU) or as a principle (WTO).
